2020.05.10.TimeToRethink

2020.05.10.TimeToRethink is open letter that warns the world politicians about excalation of the putin world war and danger of the appeasing aggression.

The letter is copipasted here in order to simplify the search and the referencing.

And also, for the case, if the letter becomes not available at its original URL .

And also, for the case, if some offee begin to presend, that they did not know that the appeasing aggression may boost the putun world war to the scale of the World War II (or even worse).

The honest use is assumed, attribute the source.

It’s Time to Rethink Our Russia Policy

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/08/05/open-letter-russia-policy-391434

WASHINGTON AND THE WORLD

Opinion | It’s Time to Rethink Our Russia Policy

America’s current mix of sanctions and diplomacy isn’t working. An open letter on how to reconsider our approach to Putin—and whoever comes next.

Opinion by ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, THOMAS GRAHAM, FIONA HILL, JON HUNTSMAN JR., ROBERT LEGVOLD and THOMAS R. PICKERING 08/05/2020 11:00 AM EDT

The following open letter was signed by 103 foreign-policy experts, whose names and affiliations appear below.

U.S.-Russia relations are at a dangerous dead end that threatens the U.S. national interest. The risk of a military confrontation that could go nuclear is again real. We are drifting toward a fraught nuclear arms race, with our foreign-policy arsenal reduced mainly to reactions, sanctions, public shaming and congressional resolutions. The global Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting serious worldwide economic decline, rather than fostering cooperation, have only reinforced the current downward trajectory.

Meanwhile, the great challenges to peace and our well-being that demand U.S.-Russia cooperation, including the existential threats of nuclear war and climate change, go unattended. Because the stakes are so high, both in the dangers they entail and the costs they contain, we believe that a careful, dispassionate analysis and change of our current course are imperative.

We go into this open-eyed. Russia complicates, even thwarts, our actions, especially along its extended periphery in Europe and Asia. It has seized territory in Ukraine and Georgia. It challenges our role as a global leader and the world order we helped build. It interferes in our domestic politics to exacerbate divisions and tarnish our democratic reputation. At best, our relations will remain a mix of competition and cooperation. The policy challenge will be to strike the most beneficial and safest balance between the two. To this end, we offer six broad prescriptions for U.S. policy.

• We must first find a way to deal effectively with Russian interference in U.S. elections and, most important, block any effort to corrupt the voting process. Hardening our electoral infrastructure, sanctioning Russians who weaponize stolen information and countering Russia’s capacity to hack our systems are all necessary measures. So is exposing Russian disinformation. We must, however, also engage Russia through negotiations out of the public glare, focused on each side’s capabilities to do great damage to the other side’s critical infrastructure.

• It makes no sense for two countries with the power to destroy each other and, in 30 minutes, to end civilization as we know it to lack fully functioning diplomatic relations. In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, key governmental contacts were severed, consulates shuttered and embassy staff drastically reduced. Too often we wrongly consider diplomatic contacts as a reward for good behavior, but they are about promoting our interests and delivering tough messages. We need them as a matter of essential security to minimize the misperceptions and miscalculations that can lead to unwanted war. Restoring normal diplomatic contacts should be a top priority for the White House and supported by the Congress.

• Our strategic posture should be that which served us well during the Cold War: a balanced commitment to deterrence and détente. Thus, while maintaining our defense, we should also engage Russia in a serious and sustained strategic dialogue that addresses the deeper sources of mistrust and hostility and at the same time focuses on the large and urgent security challenges facing both countries:

◦ The imperative to restore U.S.-Russian leadership in managing a nuclear world made more dangerous by destabilizing technologies, shifting attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons, discarded nuclear agreements and new tension-filled nuclear relationships. That means extending the New START Treaty and swiftly moving to a next phase of arms control to strengthen nuclear stability, carefully adjusted to a world of multiple nuclear actors.

◦ The imperative to make safer and more stable the military standoff that cuts across Europe’s most unstable regions, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, working vigorously to preserve existing constraints, such as the Open Skies Treaty—now under challenge—and the Vienna Document 2011, and creating new confidence-building measures.

• The success of U.S.-China policy will in no small measure depend on whether the state of U.S.-Russia relations permits three-way cooperation on critical issues. Our current policies reinforce Russia’s readiness to align with the least constructive aspects of China’s U.S. policy. Moving the needle in the opposite direction will not be easy, but should be our objective.

• On salient issues where U.S. and Russian interests are in genuine conflict, such as Ukraine and Syria, the U.S. should remain firm on principles shared with our allies and critical to a fair outcome. More attention, however, should be paid to the cumulative effect that measured and phased steps forward can have on the overall relationship, and in turn the opportunity an improving relationship creates for further steps forward.

• While sanctions should be a part of our Russia policy, they should be judiciously targeted and used in conjunction with other elements of national power, especially diplomacy. The steady accumulation of congressionally mandated sanctions as punishment for Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the poisoning in Salisbury, violations of the INF treaty and election meddling reduces any incentive Moscow might have to change course since it considers those sanctions permanent. We need to restore flexibility to our sanctions regime, focusing on targeted sanctions that can be eased quickly in exchange for Russian steps that advance negotiations toward acceptable resolutions of outstanding conflicts, including a demonstrable Russian effort to cease interference in our electoral process. Doing so will require political will on the part of both the White House and the Congress.

Ultimately, the reality is that Russia, under Vladimir Putin, operates within a strategic framework deeply rooted in nationalist traditions that resonate with elites and the public alike. An eventual successor, even one more democratically inclined, will likely operate within this same framework. Premising U.S. policy on the assumption that we can and must change that framework is misguided. Likewise, we would be unwise to think that we have no choice but to stick with current policy. We must deal with Russia as it is, not as we wish it to be, fully utilizing our strengths but open to diplomacy. So focused, we can both cope with the challenge that Russia poses and strive to put the relationship on a more constructive path. Failure to do so carries too high a price.

Rose Gottemoeller

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 2014-2016

Thomas Graham Senior Director for Russia, National Security Council staff, 2004-07

Fiona Hill Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs, National Security Council staff, 2017-19

Jon Huntsman Jr. Ambassador to Russia, 2017-19

Robert Legvold Columbia University

Thomas R. Pickering Ambassador to Russia, 1993-96

George P. Shultz Secretary of State, 1982-89

William Perry Secretary of Defense, 1994-97

Ernest J. Moniz Secretary of Energy, 2013-17 Nuclear Threat Initiative

Sam Nunn United States Senator, 1972-97 Nuclear Threat Initiative

Gary Hart United States Senator, 1975-87

John Hamre Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1997-2000

John McLaughlin Deputy Director and Acting Director, CIA, 2000-04 The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

James F. Collins Ambassador to Russia, 1998-2001

John Beyrle Ambassador to Russia, 2008-12

Meghan O’Sullivan Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, National Security Council staff, 2005-07 Harvard Kennedy School

Richard Burt Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Canada, 1983-85 Global Zero

Thomas Countryman Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, 2011-17

J. Stapleton Roy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 1999-2000 Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Wilson Center

Joseph S. Nye Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1994-95 Harvard University

Graham Allison Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans, 1993-94 Harvard Kennedy School

Gen. (ret.) Charles Boyd Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, 1992-95 Center for the National Interest

George Beebe Former Director of Russia Analysis, CIA

Mark R. Beissinger Princeton University

Richard K. Betts Columbia University

Coit D. Blacker Senior Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council, 1995-96 Stanford University

Barry Blechman Stimson Center

Ian Bremmer Eurasia Group

George Breslauer University of California at Berkeley

Edmund G. Brown, Jr. Governor of California, 1975-1983, 2011-2019 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Larry Caldwell Occidental College

Samuel Charap Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 2011-12

Peter Clement Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs

Timothy Colton Harvard University

Keith Darden American University

Jill Dougherty Georgetown University

Daniel Drezner The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Gloria Duffy Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1993-95

Susan Elliott National Committee on American Foreign Policy

Robert David English University of Southern California

Brian Finlay Stimson Center

Rosemarie C. Forsythe Director for Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council staff, 1993-95

Nancy W. Gallagher University of Maryland

James Goldgeier American University

Thane Gustafson Georgetown University

Sheila Gwaltney U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Siegfried S. Hecker Stanford University

Martin E. Hellman Stanford University

Richard E. Hoagland Caspian Policy Center

David J. Holloway Stanford University

Arnold Horelick The RAND Corporation

Edward Ifft Deputy Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency, 1991-98 Stanford University

Robert Jervis Columbia University

Jan H. Kalicki Woodrow Wilson Center

Michael Kimmage Catholic University of America

Michael Krepon Stimson Center

George Krol U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Charles Kupchan Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 2014-17 Georgetown University

Cliff Kupchan Eurasia Group

Melvyn P. Leffler University of Virginia

William Luers U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Allen C. Lynch University of Virginia

Eileen Malloy U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Steven Mann U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Jessica Mathews Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Richard H. Matzke Former Board Member (Chevron, PetroChina, and Lukoil)

John J. Mearsheimer University of Chicago

Mark Medish Senior Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council staff, 2000-01

Rajan Menon City College of New York/City University of New York

Richard Miles U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Chris Miller The Fletcher School

Matthew H. Murray Columbia University

Allan Mustard U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Larry C. Napper Texas A&M University

Michael Oppenheimer New York University

Bruce Parrott The John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Peter Pettibone Pettibone International ADR LLC

Steven Pifer Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, National Security Council staff, 1996-97 Stanford University

Paul R. Pillar Georgetown University

Barry R. Posen MIT

William Potter Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey

Jon Purnell U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Brad Roberts Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Defense Policy, 2009-13

Cynthia Roberts Hunter College, City University of New York

Matthew Rojansky The Kennan Institute

Joan Rohlfing Nuclear Threat Initiative

Lynn Rusten Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, National Security Council staff, 2012-14 Nuclear Threat Initiative

Scott Sagan Stanford University

Jeffrey Shafer National Committee on American Foreign Policy

Dimitri Simes Center for the National Interest

Christopher Smart Senior Director for International Economics, Trade & Investment, National Security Council staff, 2013-15

Jack Snyder Columbia University

J. Andrew Spindler Financial Services Volunteer Corps

Adam N. Stulberg Georgia Institute of Technology

Ronald Suny University of Michigan

Daniel Treisman UCLA

Anna Vassilieva Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey

Stephen M. Walt Harvard University

Jon Wolfsthal Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, National Security Council staff, 2014-17 Global Zero

Kenneth Yalowitz U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Stephen M. Young U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

Donald Zagoria National Committee on American Foreign Policy

Peter B. Zwack Brigadier General (ret.), The Kennan Institute

Note: All signers are acting in their personal capacity. Institutional affiliations are listed for purposes of identification only and do not imply institutional support for the content of the letter.

Responses to this open Letter

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Historic context

The letter appears in 2020.

That time, the main goals of the putin's aggresion are already revealed, see «Весь мир будет наш», «Мы попадём в рай а они сдохнут», «От Аляски до Одесы»,

The original publication (and especially subsection "Responses to this open Letter") makes impression that the letter had been ignored by the American administration.

This ignorance refutes the hypothesis that the American offees did not know that they actually boost the new world war appeasing aggression.

The hypothesis is left that the American offees boost the Putin world war intentionally, and make negotiations with the war crime putin in order to boost the war, to prolong the war, to make it more bloody, more destructice (and perhaps to get some benefits from the long war).

Such an hypothesis agrees with interpretations of statements by Donald Trump using the Rule of Newspeak. At such an intrepretion, the promise to End war in 24 hours means that Trump will try to boost the Putin world war and keep the war as long as possible. Such an interepotation shows good agreement with the posteriori publications.

Malek Fouda indicates that Donald Trimp confirms that his statements have opposite meanings ("sarcasm") .

In such a way, Donald Trump sees nothing wrong in tricking his electors

This observation indicates, that all the statements by the Trump's administration can be treated as just a sarcasm, as a mockery of common sense and interpreted following the Rule of Newspeak.

References

Keywords

«Appeasing aggression», «Budapest memorandum», «Collapse of USA», «Corruption», «Designate Russia as state sponsor of terrorism», «Designate Russia as terrorist state», «Dvizhuha», «History», «Moscovia», «New World Order», «Open letter», «Pahanat», «Politico», «Putin world war», «Trump as KGB agent», «USA»,

«Будапештский меморандум», «Движуха», «Московия», «Путинская мировая война», «Российское вторжение в Украину», «Спецоперация», «Трамп Дональд Фредович», «Умиротворение агрессора»,